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Lessons from the Oil Shocks
of the 1970s
technology, the size and skill level of the labor
force, as well as the availability and price of
various other resources.
For example, the recent jump in the price of
oil will lead producers to economize on the use
of relatively high priced energy and machines
that were built to use cheap oil because they
will have become inefficient. Economy-wide
How do demand and supply interact? It is easiest
to think of changes in aggregate supply as deter-
mining how any change in total spending will
be split between output growth and inflation.
Changes in aggregate demand and supply
therefore have different effects on real GNP
growth and inflation. A decrease in the growth
rate of total spending caused by a tightening
of monetary policy would lower both real GNP
growth and inflation. In contrast, a decrease in
aggregate supply would lower real GNP growth
but raise inflation. A reduction in the supply of
oil, or an increase in its price, implies a reduc-
tion in the physical output of the economy and,
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The price of oil has shot up dramatically since
the beginning of August in an escalation remi-
niscent of the oil shocks of the 1970s. Ifthe price
of oil were to settle around the levels that pre-
vailed in the first half of October, the propor-
tional change would be of the same order of
magnitude as the ones in 1978 and in 1986
but smaller than the one in 1973.
The recent oil shock has led many to call
upon the Federal Reserve to ease monetary
policy to keep an already weak economy from
being pushed into recession. This Letter reviews
evidence from the 1970s to argue that there is no
easy way to avoid the economic losses brought
on by higher oil prices, and that a moderate
policy response that seeks to maintain rather
than boost total spending is best for stabilizing
output and controlling inflation.
Chart 1shows the quarterly averages of the
price of imported oil with and without an adjust-
ment for inflation since 1965. The value for the
fourth quarter of 1990 is an estimate, based on
prices that prevailed in the first two weeks of
October. In relative terms, the first oil shock in
1973 was much larger than the second in 1978.
Also, although the drop in the price of oil in
1986 meant that oil was selling for $4 per barrel
in 1965 prices, the recent jump has taken the
inflation-adjusted price of oil above the level
that prevailed after the first oil shock.
Demand and supply
To understand the effects of an oil shock,
it is useful to think of economy-wide output
and inflation as determined by the interaction
of aggregate demand and supply. Aggregate
demand is total spending in the economy by
households, businesses, and government. Its
determinants include consumer and business
expectations of future income and prices, as well
as monetary and fiscal policy. Aggregate supply
refers to production from all domestic sources,
and is determined by factors such as the level ofFRBSF
This interpretation is supported by several
studies of the period. Researchers have generally
concluded that the Fed eased policy to overcome
the reduction in output caused by the oil em-
bargo. Professor Thomas Mayer of the University
of California at Davis points out that the FOMC
minutes reveal that several Committee members
explicitly argued that the rise in oil prices should
be accommodated, and that real money balances
should not be allowed to shrink.
Two kinds of evidence are available to study
how policymakers responded to this shock. First,
we can look at the funds rate, since the Federal
Reserve's policy goals over this period were usu-
ally expressed in terms of a desired range for the
funds rate. Second, we can look at scholarly
studies from the period and minutes of Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings. The
FOMC is the body within the Federal Reserve
that sets monetary policy.
The pattern of movement in the federal funds
rate suggests that the Federal Reserve actually
eased policy immediately following the oil price
shock in the fourth quarter of that year. The fed-
eral funds rate rose sharply over the first three
quarters of 1973, reflecting the accelerating in-
flation rate over this period. It then fell more
than 100 basis points over the next two quarters.
Since inflation was actually rising quite rapidly
over this period, the fall in the inflation-adjusted
funds was substantial.
However, the FOMC soon reversed this initial
response. With the lifting of wage and price
controls in April 1974, it became obvious that
inflation was out of control. By June, the minutes
ofthe FOMC meetings reveal that the Commit-
tee's emphasis had shifted to controlling infla-
tion. The fund's rate rose nearly 250 basis points
in the second and third quarters of the year, be-
fore falling back. Chart 2 shows that real GNP
growth turned negative in the third quarter of
1974. However, a recession was not generally
recognized to have been underway. Forecasters,
including those at the Board of Governors ofthe
Federal Reserve, underestimated inflation and
overestimated real·GNP growth over late 1974
and early 1975.
The Fed did ease monetary policy when the
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production will drop as a result, and leave fewer
total goods to be exchanged for an unchanged
amount of spending. The direct result is inflation.
This supply effect is not the only effect of a
jump in the price of oil. Since the u.s. must
now pay more for imported oil, there will be
some reduction in aggregate spending on do-
mestic goods as well. However, as the evidence
presented below reveals, the dominant effect
of an oil shock appears to be a reduction in
aggregate supply.
The first oil shock
The first oil shock in 1973 took place in a
setting of already rising inflation. As shown
in Chart 2, inflation had begun to increase in
the second half of the 1960s. From the fourth
quarter of 1968 to the fourth quarter of 1969, for
instance, the CPI rose at close to a 6 percent
rate. Although the rate of inflation did fall when
the economy went into recession in 1970, the
Nixon administration judged inflation to be se-
vere enough to impose price controls in August
1971. The measured rate of inflation declined as
a result of the controls, but unfortunately, the
controls also allowed economic policy to be-
come highly expansionary by hiding the effect of
policy on prices. Real GNP surged in response.
By the end of 1972, inflation was rising while the
dollar was depreciating rapidly. The situation was
aggravated by below-normal harvests and crop
failures in several parts of the world. Then, in the
last quarter of 1973, came the oil embargo and
the nearly threefold increase in the price of oil.
Chart 2
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:' \ Inflation 12the funds rate fell below 5Y2 percent in the sec-
ond quarter of 1975. Unfortunately, the funds rate
generally stayed around that level for the next
two to three years, while the inflation rate (as
measured by the epl) generally stayed above. In
addition to an easier monetary policy, the U.S.
shifted to an expansionary fiscal policy in 1975.
The economy boomed in response: the growth
rate of real GNP averaged more than 4 percent
over the three years ending in 1978. Inflation
picked up as well, with the ePI increasing by
nearly 7 percent in the four quarters ending
in the second quarter of 1978.
The second oil shock
The second oil price shock in 1978 was more
drawn out. Prices began to increase from roughly
$13 a barrel in late 1978 and rose to above $30
a barrel in mid-1980. The beginning of the Iran-
Iraq war in September 1980 had a further effect:
oil prices rose above $35 in the first half of 1981,
before beginning a protracted decline that culmi-
nated in the oil price collapse of 1986.
The second oil shock helped push inflation into
the double-digit range. In fact, during the first
half of1980, the year-aver-year increase in the
ePI averaged more than 14 percent. The Fed's
response is well-known: in October 1979, it
began to target a reduction in the growth rate of
the money supply. The funds rate rose above 15
percent in 1980, fell temporarily, and then rose
again to average nearly 18 percent over mid-
1981. Real GNP contracted in two not so distinct
episodes, first in 1980 and then again in 1982.
The upshot was a decline in inflation to a roughly
4 percent rate. Thus, the Fed's ultimate response
to the second oil shock was the same as its ulti-
mate response to the first.
It is interesting that the Fed's initial response
to the second oil shock also was similar to its
response to the first oil shock. Specifically, it
seems that policy tended at first to reinforce the
inflationary pressures arising from the jump in
oil prices. Although the nominal funds rate rose
rapidly after the second oil shock, the inflation-
adjusted funds rate remained negative prior to
the change in the Fed's operating procedures in
the fourth quarter of 1979. The rate of increase of
the ePI averaged 11.8 percent over the four quar-
ters ending in the third quarter of 1979, while the
funds rate averaged 10.9 percent in that quarter.
One interpretation of these developments is that
the Fed had turned overly cautious in guarding
against another economic downturn after the
1975 recession, and ended up easing policy
in the face of rising inflation.
Policy implications
Each time the price of oil shot up in the 1970s,
the Fed first followed what can be termed an
"accommodative policy," that is, it tried to keep
output constant in the face of an adverse supply
shock. However, when the extent of the jump in
inflation became known, the Fed shifted its pol-
icy stance and tried to extinguish this inflation
by adopting contractionary policies.
The discussion above suggests that a more
moderate course would have been better. Spe-
cifically, a policy of keeping the growth rate of
total spending unchanged in the face of the oil
shock would have provided a more even balance
between the Fed's objectives of stabilizing real
output growth and keeping inflation in check.
Such a policy would imply some decline in out-
put growth and some increase in the inflation
rate as prices moved to a new, higher level.
While such an outcome is unpleasant, it appears
to be the best policymakers can do in response
to an oil shock.
To understand why a moderate course is best,
it is important to realize that the reduction in
aggregate supply is a real loss with some painful
consequences that are inescapable. Policymqkers
cannot reverse the effects of an oil price shock,
just as they cannot reverse the effects of an
agricuItural drought.
Thus, attempts to offset the oil shock by
stimulating aggregate demand through monetary
or fiscal policy will temporarily raise output, but
will probably also lock the economy into a cycle
of accelerating inflation. If past experience were
any guide, bringing that inflation back to accept-
able levels would likely impose further substan-
tial costs on the economy.
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